All-American Rape by Anderson, Michelle J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 79 
Number 3 Volume 79, Summer 2005, Number 3 Article 2 
February 2012 
All-American Rape 
Michelle J. Anderson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Anderson, Michelle J. (2005) "All-American Rape," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 79 : No. 3 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol79/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ALL-AMERICAN RAPE
MICHELLE J. ANDERSONt
INTRODUCTION
What is rape? What is the harm in it, and how should the
law conceptualize the crime? In this Article, I will contrast the
classic rape narrative with a typical rape, describe how the law
and legal scholars have conceptualized the harm of rape, and
contrast those conceptions with the experience of rape for its
victims and offenders. I will then begin to explore the legal
implications of a focus on the experience of rape and suggest a
new set of requirements for the crime. In this short discussion I
cannot hope to persuade you of the merits of my proposal. For
that I hope another article of mine entitled Negotiating Sex,
forthcoming in the Southern California Law Review,' will do.
What I do hope to convince you of is that current legal
conceptions are inadequate to the lived experience of the crime of
rape.
I. CLASSIC RAPE NARRATIVE
When asked to imagine the classic rape, the American mind
often conjures up a narrative something like this:
A fair young woman is walking home alone at night. Gray
street lamps cast shadows from the figure she cuts
through an urban landscape. She hurries along, unsure of
her safety. Suddenly, perhaps from behind a dumpster, a
strange, dark man lunges out at her, knife at her throat,
and drags her into a dark alley where he threatens to kill
her, and beats her until she bleeds. The young woman
puts up a valiant fight to protect her sexual virtue, but
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School;
LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Michael Simons and the
rest of the faculty at St. John's University School of Law where I delivered this
Distinguished Scholar Lecture, as well as Marc Spindelman, Angela Pappas, Alicia
Coleman, and Robin West for their tremendous help.
1 Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
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the assailant overcomes her will and rapes her.
Afterwards, she immediately calls the police to report the
offense.
This classic rape narrative is woven from a racist and sexist
mythology specific to our country and its history.2 Color infuses
the yarn: sinister blackness against innocent whiteness, in a
conflict that draws red blood.3 Extrinsic, violent assaults by a
stranger are the weft and warp of the tale: the rapist's wielding
of a knife, his dragging her into an alley, his threat of death, his
beating.
Despite generations of repeated storytelling, this type of rape
is, in terms of actual incidence, a statistical outlier-so different
from the norm as to be exceptional rather than typical. Contrast
that classic narrative with a description of a typical rape, one in
which both the offender and the victim are of your own race:
A male and a female student meet at a party and begin to
talk, drink, and flirt. Later, she wanders to a quiet place
with him. Once there, he pushes her down, pins her, and
begins kissing her aggressively. She does not want to be
rude. He must have misunderstood, she thinks. The
alcohol is getting to her, she feels dizzy, and she wonders
if she is going to throw up. She says, "Ummm...
wait... please... I'm not sure that this is what we
should do." He ignores her and begins taking off their
clothes. She cannot seem to get away, and her panic rises.
She cries as he penetrates her. Shamed by the
experience, she does not tell anyone until three years later
when she confides in a trusted friend. She never calls the
police.
This time there are no extrinsic, violent assaults by a
stranger-no knife, no dragging into an alley, no threat of death,
no beating. There is no black male attack on white femaleness,
no brawl that draws red blood. Yet, this story represents the
2 See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 86-112 (1988) (explaining that European immigrants to
America differentiated themselves from nonwhites by merging sexual and racial
ideologies in order to gain social control over slaves and justify the appropriation of
land).
3 See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 33-39, 52,
85 (1981); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1271 (1991)(describing how blacks have long been portrayed as more sexual, gratification-
oriented people).
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statistical norm of sexual assault in this country-no matter the
race of the parties, it is an all-American rape.
The typical rape in the United States does not happen in an
alleyway. It most often happens in the victim's own home or in
the home of a friend, relative, or neighbor. 4 The typical rape is
not launched by a stranger. Acquaintances and intimate
partners commit the vast majority of rapes. 5 The typical rape
does not involve a black man attacking a white woman. Rape is
overwhelmingly an intra-racial crime. 6 The typical rape involves
no knives, guns, or other weapons. 7 Many rapists find verbal
coercion and pinning sufficient.8  The typical rape does not
involve valiant physical resistance on the part of the victim.
Frozen in fright, many women cry or remain passive in the face
of a sexual attack. 9 The typical rape does not involve a victim
with untainted sexual virtue. Rape happens to imperfect,
complicated souls-like all of us-whose sexual pasts could not
withstand critical public scrutiny. 10 The typical rape does not
include a prompt report to the police; many victims never report
their most harrowing experiences to any authority figures.1"
Stuck as it is on the classic rape narrative, the law has
4 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.61 (2002)
(indicating that the highest percentages of rapes occur in the victim's home or the
home of a friend or relative).
5 Id. at tbl.43 (stating that about sixty-eight percent of rapes and sexual
assaults are committed by acquaintances, relatives, and intimates).
6 See id. at tbl.42 (indicating that eighty-six percent of black victims report
black offenders and fourteen percent report white offenders, while seventy-six
percent of white victims report white offenders and thirteen percent report black
offenders).
7 Id. at tbl.66 (showing that eighty-five percent of rapes and sexual assaults
involve no weapons).
8 See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 953, 1003 n.298 (noting studies which indicate that offenders in acquaintance
rapes use a high level of verbal abuse but little physical force).
9 See Anderson, supra note 1; Anderson, supra note 8, at 958 (explaining that
girls are taught to remain passive in situations like rape).
10 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License:
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 101-02
(2002) (citing studies that show young women today engage in more sexual
experiences and at younger ages).
11 See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault,
84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 978-79 (2004) (citing statistics that show "63 percent of rapes,
65 percent of attempted rapes, and 74 percent of sexual assaults were not reported
to the police").
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fundamentally misconceived the crime. Instead of criminalizing
rape, it has criminalized the extrinsic, violent assault: a bloody
brawl with the goal of obtaining sex. The classic rape narrative
actually involves at least two crimes: assault and rape. The all-
American rape, by contrast, involves just one-the rape itself.
Both historically and at present, the law has remained obsessed
with criminalizing the extrinsic, violent assault and has
disregarded the rape.
English common law defined rape as a man obtaining sexual
intercourse by force and without a woman's consent. In 1769, in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone
explained that rape was "the carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly and against her will." 12 "Forcibly" meant that the man
used physical force or its threat to obtain sexual penetration.13
"Against her will" meant that the woman did not consent to
sexual penetration, and the law required that she resist him to
the utmost of her physical capacity to express her non-consent. 14
The common law, therefore, required a physical fight on two
parts. It required the victim to put up physical resistance
against a sexual attack, and it required a rapist to overcome the
victim's physical resistance with force. 15
The English common law definition of rape has not
disappeared over time. For instance, in the Uniform Crime
Reports the FBI defines rape today as "carnal knowledge of a
female forcibly and against her will"-precisely how Blackstone
defined it 236 years ago.1 6
II. RAPE IN STATE STATUTES
Like the FBI's definition, although less literally, the vast
majority of state laws in the United States derive from the classic
rape narrative: they basically require a defendant to exert force
against his victim before the state may convict him of what is
commonly thought of as rape. Setting aside those circumstances
12 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 209
(1895).
13 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 59-60 (1987).
14 ESTRICH, supra note 13, at 59, 64-65; Anderson, supra note 8, at 962-63.
15 See Anderson, supra note 8, at 962-63 (discussing the history of resistance in
the common law rape).
16 FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002 (2002),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius-02/html/web/offreported/02-nforciblerape04.
html (defining forcible rape).
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in which the victim cannot consent-such as when the victim is
underage, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless 17- in
order to be convicted of a state's highest, non-aggravated sexual
offense, statutes in forty-three states and the District of
Columbia require that the defendant use force I8 against his
17 This would also include circumstances involving an abuse of authority or
apparent authority. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.410(a)(3)-(4) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1401(5)(b) (defining
"without consent"), 13-1405-13-1406 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(1)(B)-(D)
(Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261(a)(1), (3)-(5), (7), 261.5, 286(b)-(h) (Deering
Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(b)-(h) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
70(a)(2)-(4) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(h) (defining "without consent"),
773(a)(5)-(6) (Supp. 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3008 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.011(2)(a)-(b), (4)(a), (d)-(g) (West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-
1(a)(2), 16-6-3 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT ANN. § 707-730(1)(b)-(c) (LexisNexis Supp.
2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-1508, 18-1508A, 18-6101(1)-(2), (4)-(6), 18-6108(1),
(4)-(5) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(3)-(4), 5/12-14.1 (2002); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-42-4-1(a)(2)-(3), 35-42-4-2(a)(2)-(3), 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (West 2004); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-3502(a)(1)(B)-(C), (a)(2)-(4), 21-3505(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 2004); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 510.040(1)(b), 510.080(1)(b) (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
14:43(A)(1)-(3), 14:80, 14:80.1 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 253(1)(B)-
(C), (2)(A), (C)-(G), 254 (Supp. 2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23
(LexisNexis 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(a)-(d), (g)-(h) (2003); MINN.
STAT. § 609.342(a)-(b), (e)-(h) (2003); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.032, 566.060, 566.062
(West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1) (defining "without consent"), 45-5-503
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.366, 200.368 (Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-2 (a)-(b), (c)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(C)(1) (West
Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35 (2)-(4), 130.50 (2)-(4), 130.75 (McKinney
2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2(a)(1), 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(b)-(e) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1)(b)-(c),
2907.03(A), 2907.04 (LexisNexis 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(1)-(2),
(5) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.375(1)(b)-(d), 163.405(1)(b)-(d), 163.411(1)(b)-(c),
163.435, 163.445 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3121(a)(3)-(5),(c), 3122.1, 3125(a)(4)-
(8) (Supp. 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2(1), (3)-(4), 11-37-8.1 (2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-655 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-1(1),(3)-(5), 22-22-30.1 (1998
& Supp. 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2), (b) (defining "without
consent") (Vernon Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61(A)(ii)-(iii), 18.2-63, 18.2-
67.2(A)(1)-(2) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.073 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), 61-8B-4(a)(2) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.02(1), 948.09
(West Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(iii)-(iv) (2005).
18 Statutory language used to express the force requirements varies. Fourteen
states use only the term "force." See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3002 (LexisNexis 2001);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-13 (2002); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 253 (Supp.
2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(f) (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (c)
(West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
11(A)(2), (E) (West Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114 (West 2002); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-1(2), 11-37-2 (2) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-654 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (Supp. 2003); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(ii) (2005). Four
states use a form of the phrase "compels by force." See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70
(1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03
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victim.19 Although eight of these forty-four statutes appear to
require only non-consent, they include the use of force in the
definition of "non-consent."20
(1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (LexisNexis 2003). One state requires that a
defendant coerce by threat of force. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West Supp.
2005). Nine states use the term "forcible compulsion." See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61
(Supp. 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
510.040 (LexisNexis 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West 1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.35 (McKinney 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3121 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 61-8B-4(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2000). West Virginia combines
"without... consent" and "forcible compulsion," and because forcible compulsion is a
required element it is included here. Two states use the term "compulsion." See
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 253 (Supp. 2004).
19 The following statutes deal only with the highest level offense that is not
aggravated. See ALA. CODE. §§ 13A-6-61(a)(1), 13-6-63(a)(1), 13-6-65.1(a)(1) (Supp.
2004); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(1)-(2) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406
(2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
261(2), 286(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2004); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-70(a)(1) (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (Supp. 2004); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3002 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(3), (4)(b) (West
Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-1(a)(1) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-
730(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6101(3), 18-6108(2)-(3)
(2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-13(1) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1(a)(1),
35-42-4-2(a)(1)-(b)(1) (West 2004); KAN. STAT ANN. § 21-3502(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2004);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040(1)(a) (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:42.1 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(A) (Supp. 2004); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303(a)(1), 3-304(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 22(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b(1)(e)-(f)
(2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.030 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-
501(1)(a), 45-5-503 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis Supp. 2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (West Supp. 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(C)(2)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.35(1), 130.50(1) (McKinney 2004);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2(a)(2), 14-27.4(a)(2) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20.03(1)(a) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2002); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1114(A)(3) (West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.375(1)(a),
163.405(1)(a), 163.411(1)(a) (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT § 3121(a)(1) (Supp. 2005); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(2) (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652(1)(a) (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(2) (Supp. 2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i) (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.44.040 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-4(a) (LexisNexis 2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2) (West Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302(a)(i) (2005).
20 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410, 11.41.470(8)(A) (2004) ('[W]ithout consent'
means that a person ... is coerced by the use of force .... "); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1401(5)(a), 13-1406 (2001) ("Without consent' includes ... the victim [being]
coerced by the immediate use or threatened use of force .... "); CAL. PENAL CODE §
261(a)(2) (Deering Supp. 2005) ("Rape is... accomplished against a person's will by
means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the person or another."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(h)(1), 773 (a)(5)-
(6) (Supp. 2004) ("Without consent' means ... the defendant compelled the victim to
[Vol. 79:625
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Sixteen states and the District of Columbia do criminalize
sexual penetration that is non-consensual and without force. 21
These states, however, impose less punishment upon non-
submit by any act of coercion.., or by force...."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502
(Supp. 2004) ("Rape is: (1) Sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to
the sexual intercourse, under any of the following circumstances ... (A) [w]hen the
victim is overcome by force or fear .. "); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502, 45-5-503,
45-5-501(1)(a) (2003) ("[W]ithout consent' means ... the victim is compelled to
submit by force against the victim or another .... "); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
22.011(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (defining "sexual assault" as "without the consent
of the other person if ... the actor compels the other person to submit or participate
by the use of physical force or violence"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West Supp.
2004) ("Consent'. . . means words or overt actions by a person who is competent to
give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse
or sexual contact.").
21 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (Supp. 2004) (defining sexual misconduct as
intercourse occurring "without [the victim's] consent"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a
(1999) (making sexual contact without consent a misdemeanor fourth degree sexual
assault); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3006 (LexisNexis 2001) (defining "misdemeanor
sexual abuse" as "engag[ing] in a sexual act ... without that other person's
permission"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5) (West Supp. 2005) (defining second
degree sexual battery as "without that person's consent" and without the use of
force); HAw REV. STAT ANN. §§ 707-700, 707-733 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (noting
that "compulsion" necessary for fourth degree sexual assault is satisfied simply by
the absence of consent); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 510.130 (LexisNexis 1999) (making
sexual contact without the other's permission a misdemeanor); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A, § 255-A(1)(B) (Supp. 2004) ("The other person has not expressly or
impliedly acquiesced in the sexual contact and the sexual contact includes
penetration."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308 (Supp. 2004) (making contact
without consent a sexual offense in the fourth degree); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451
(West 2003) (defining criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree as nonconsensual
sexual contact); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.040 (West 1999) (defining sexual assault as
"sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so without that
person's consent"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20 (McKinney 2004) (defining the crime of
"sexual misconduct" as sexual intercourse without the person's consent); N.D. CENT.
CODE 12.1-20-07(1)(a) (Supp. 2003) (noting that "sexual assault" requires one to
"knowingly ha[ve] sexual contact" and "know[ ] or ha[ve] reasonable cause to believe
that the contact is offensive to the other person"); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.425(1) (2003)
(stating that one who commits second degree sexual abuse "subjects another person
to sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or ... penetration ... and the
victim does not consent thereto"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (Supp. 2005) (defining
the offense of sexual assault as "sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
intercourse.., without the complainant's consent"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4
(Supp. 2003) ("No person fifteen years of age or older may knowingly engage in
sexual contact with another person other than his spouse who, although capable of
consenting, has not consented to such contact."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060
(West 2000) (creating a lesser offense "[w]here the victim did not consent ... and
such lack of consent was clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct"); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West Supp. 2004) (defining third degree sexual assault as
any sexual intercourse or contact "without the consent" of the victim).
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consensual penetration, 22 with greater than half of them
categorizing these offenses as mere misdemeanors. 23
Overall, then, under just six state statutes does the All-
American rape constitute the highest, non-aggravated sexual
22 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(3), (5) (West Supp. 2005) (defining sexual battery
without consent as a second degree felony while sexual battery with force is a felony
punishable by life in prison); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 253(1)(A), 255-A(1)(A)
(Supp. 2004) (defining gross sexual assault with compulsion as a Class A crime and
non-consensual sexual contact as a Class D crime); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
557.021(3)(1)(a), 566.030, 566.040 (West 1999) (making forcible rape a Class A felony
and sexual assault without consent a Class C felony by stating that "[iut is a Class A
felony if the authorized penalty includes death, life imprisonment or imprisonment
for a term of twenty years or more"); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, 12.1-20-07
(Supp. 2003) (defining gross sexual imposition requiring force as a Class A felony
while making nonconsensual sexual assault a Class C felony); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3124.1 (Supp. 2005) (classifying sexual intercourse without consent as a second
degree felony); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.44.060 (West 2000)
(defining first degree rape requiring forcible compulsion as Class A felony and third
degree rape requiring only non-consent as a Class C felony); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.225 (West Supp. 2004) (establishing sexual assault in the first degree as a Class
B felony and sexual assault in the third degree as a Class G felony).
Minnesota, which does not divide its crimes into felonies and misdemeanors,
imposes discrepant punishments for forcible and nonconsensual sexual contact. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342, 609.3451 (West 2003). Criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree is punishable by a maximum of thirty years in prison and a $40,000 fine
while the lesser offense of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree is punishable
by not more than one year in jail and a maximum $3,000 fine. See id.
23 ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-61, 13A-6-65 (Supp. 2004) (making first degree rape with
force a felony and the offense of sexual misconduct, requiring only non-consent, a
misdemeanor); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-70, 53a-73a (West 2005) (making
sexual assault in the first degree a Class B felony and sexual assault in the fourth
degree, requiring only non-consent, a misdemeanor); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3002, 22-
3006 (LexisNexis 2005) (making first degree sexual abuse a Class A felony and the
lesser offense of sexual abuse, requiring only a lack of permission, a misdemeanor);
HAW. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 707-700, 707-730, 707-733 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004)
(making sexual assault in the first degree, requiring strong compulsion, a Class A
felony and sexual assault in the fourth degree, requiring compulsion defined by mere
non-consent, a misdemeanor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.040, 510.140 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2004) (making rape in the first degree a Class B felony and the lesser offense
of sexual misconduct without permission a misdemeanor); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW §§ 3-303, 3-308 (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) (making rape in the first degree, which
requires force, a felony and sexual offense in the fourth degree, requiring contact
without consent, a misdemeanor); NY PENAL LAW §§ 130.20, 130.35 (McKinney
Supp. 2005) (making rape in the first degree, requiring force, a Class B felony while
making the lesser offense of "sexual misconduct," requiring only non-consent, a
misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.375, 163.415 (Supp. 2004) (making rape in the
first degree a Class A felony and sexual abuse in the third degree, requiring only
nonconsensual contact, a Class A misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-1(7),
22-22-7.4 (Supp. 2003) (allowing second degree rape to be a Class 2 felony and the
offense of "sexual contact without consent with person capable of consenting" to be a
misdemeanor).
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offense.24 Under the statutes of sixteen states and the District of
Columbia, the all-American rape is a lesser sexual offense, half of
the time a lowly misdemeanor.25 Under twenty-seven state
statutes-in other words, under a majority of state statutes-the
all-American rape is no crime at all.
Culturally, as well as legally, the classic rape narrative
remains the public face of rape in this country. It is statistically
rare but spoken of frequently. It leads the nightly news; it has
centered academic discussion of the crime.26 The all-American
rape, by contrast, is painfully common but almost never
discussed. Its victims rarely come forward for they know they
will be blamed if they do.27 As a result, the classic rape narrative
is the official story of rape in this country, while the reality of the
all-American rape is suppressed.
At least two legal scholars have written of their own
experiences of rape. Professor Susan Estrich, who is white, has
24 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-95 (Supp. 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-318, 28-
319 (Supp.2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(m) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (Supp. 2004); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 2004).
Only the New Jersey Supreme Court has greatly deviated from its state's
statutory force requirement. The court interpreted the victim's non-consent as
satisfying the statute's force requirement. New Jersey ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1276 (N.J. 1992) (stating that because the victim is not required to resist, she does
not need to say or do anything for the sexual penetration to be unlawful). In a
narrower way, three other states may be limiting their statutory force requirements
as well. See People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Cal. 1994) (establishing that
resistance is not required to prove sexual assault); State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d
1261, 1271 (Kan. 1994) (stating that the relevant statute requires a finding that the
victim did not give her consent and that she was overcome by force or fear to
facilitate intercourse but not that the victim was overcome by force in the form of a
beating or physical restraint); State v. Gamez, 494 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that evidence of coercion through creation of fear is sufficient to
affirm a conviction for criminal sexual conduct). Nevertheless, there are few reported
cases in New Jersey in which the defendant did not employ extrinsic force or a
threat of such force. Likewise, in the seven states in which the criminal law statute
does not require force, the case law is not markedly different from that in states in
which there is a statutory force requirement.
25 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
26 See ESTRICH, supra note 13, at 1-2 (discussing her own rape experience,
which is similar to the classic rape); Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a
Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 221-24 (1988) (reviewing ESTRICH, supra
note 13).
27 See Anna Wakelin & Karen M. Long, Effects of Victim Gender and Sexuality
on Attributions of Blame to Rape Victims, 49 SEX ROLES 477, 477 (2003) (arguing
that the authorities, the rapists, and even the victims themselves often attribute the
blame for the crime to the victim).
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written about a black man stealing her car and money, holding
an ice pick to her throat, threatening to kill her, and raping her.28
She promptly reported her rape to the police. 29 Professor Lynne
Henderson has written about a stranger breaking into her house,
brandishing a screwdriver, threatening to kill her, breaking her
nose and jaw, beating her bloody, and raping her.3 0 After her
prompt report to the police, the offender was "caught, convicted,
and sent to prison for a long time. '31 It was important and
beneficial for these women to come forward to discuss their own
rapes. They are particularly courageous because many legal
academics regard personal experience not as a valuable source of
knowledge that may enhance the scholarly discourse but as a
troubling and perhaps disqualifying taint to one's academic
objectivity.
Notably, however, these two legal scholars' experiences
reflect only the official story of rape, the classic rape narrative.
Few scholars have come forward to discuss their experiences of
the all-American rape. Yet how many more of us must there be?
III. CONCEIVING THE HARM OF RAPE
Scan recent legal literature on the harm of rape and one may
be surprised to discover the frequent assertion that sexual
intercourse is intrinsically pleasurable32-an assertion that does
not begin to approximate the complexity of women's experiences
of being sexually penetrated.33 For example, Professor Joshua
28 ESTRICH, supra note 13, at 1-2.
29 Id. at 1-2.
30 Henderson, supra note 26, at 221-24.
31 Id. at 223.
32 See Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going:
Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 429
(1998); Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 557, 582 (2000).
33 It is not hard to discern whose pleasure these gentlemen have in mind. Using
one's penis to penetrate someone else is ordinarily very pleasurable. Being
penetrated, however, is much less so. Sexual penetration does not normally bring
female ecstasy. Although effective at obtaining male orgasm, penetration is
remarkably ineffective at obtaining female orgasm. See generally Anne Koedt, The
Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in FEMINISM IN OUR TIME: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS,
WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT 333 (Miriam Schneir ed., 1994). Seventy percent of
women do not experience orgasm regularly from sexual penetration. See SHERE
HITE, THE NEW HITE REPORT: THE REVOLUTIONARY REPORT ON FEMALE SEXUALITY
UPDATED 212 (2000). Women's and men's first experiences of heterosexual
intercourse are telling. While seventy-nine percent of men experienced orgasm their
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Dressier, who advocates requiring a conscious victim to object
before unwanted sexual intercourse is rape, argues that because
''sexual contact ordinarily is a pleasurable event that humans
generally seek rather than avoid ... it is not grossly
unreasonable to expect the parties to make their wishes evident
in sexual affairs."34 When arguing that most deception to obtain
sexual intercourse should remain legal, Professor David Bryden
asserts:
[S]ex is typically pleasurable in itself. Consequently, it usually
is less clear whether the sexual encounter would have occurred
without the deception and also whether the deception destroyed
the value of the encounter to the victim .... [A] sexual
relationship ... is usually mutually pleasurable even if
seriously dishonest in some respect.35
Concerned that criminalizing sexual penetration with an
intoxicated person may fabricate an "ideologically loaded" form of
"retrospective distress," Professor Alan Wertheimer asserts that
"it is arguable that most sexual relationships-even intoxicated
sexual relationships-are pleasurable, that they do not typically
involve significant physical or psychological harm."36 Implicit in
the subjective assertion that sexual penetration is pleasurable
and not harmful is the idea that the extrinsic, violent assault of
the classic rape narrative is the central harm of rape.
first time, only seven percent of women did. See Susan Sprecher, Anita Barbee &
Pepper Schwartz, "Was It Good for You, Too?"." Gender Differences in First Sexual
Intercourse Experiences, 32 J. SEX RES. 3, 9 (1995).
Setting aside those acts that are coerced or forced, many acts of sexual
penetration remain unwanted. For twenty-five percent of women, their first
experience, although voluntary, was not wanted. See Edward 0. Laumann, Early
Sexual Experiences: How Voluntary? How Violent?, in SEXUALITY & AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY, 11 (Smith et al. eds., 1996). Thirty percent of a sample of college
women had previously engaged in unwanted intercourse because they perceived that
the cost of refusing sex was higher than cost of submitting to it. Miriam Lewin,
Unwanted Intercourse: The Difficulty of Saying No, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 184, 184-
87 (1985). Other acts of sexual penetration, although desired, turn out to be
physically painful or emotionally deadening "masturbation in the vagina," as
Germaine Greer famously phrased it. Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch, in
FEMINISM IN OUR TIME, supra, at 343, 349. Even if one could ignore the enormous
physical and emotional risks of unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted
diseases, it is inappropriate to conceive of the penetration of a body as a simple,
pleasurable act. The act of penetration for the person being penetrated contains the
intrinsic potential for harm.
34 Dressler, supra note 32, at 429.
35 David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 463-64 (2000).
36 Wertheimer, supra note 32, at 582.
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Without an extrinsic, violent assault, the law has often
assumed there is no harm in rape. In Coker v. Georgia, for
example, the United States Supreme Court assessed the harm of
rape in order to determine whether the imposition of capital
punishment was grossly disproportionate for the crime under the
Eighth Amendment. 37 Erlich Coker escaped from the Ware
Correctional Institution in Georgia, where he was serving life
sentences for murder and rape, and entered the house of Elnita
and Allen Carver.38  Coker threatened the couple, tied Allen
Carver up, stole his money, obtained a knife from the kitchen,
brandished it at Elnita Carver, and raped her.39 Later, he stole
the Carvers' car and kidnapped Elnita in it.40 Justice White,
writing for a plurality of the Court, wrote that, when the police
apprehended Coker, "Mrs. Carver was unharmed."41  By this
bland assertion, White presumably meant that Coker did not
stab Elnita Carver with his knife or beat her bloody. When
assessing the gravity of the offense for Eighth Amendment
purposes, White wrote, "[Rape] is also a violent crime because it
normally involves force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to
overcome the will and the capacity of the victim to resist."42
White's description assumed the classic rape narrative: the harm
of rape was the extrinsic violent assault, and the rape itself was
no harm at all.43
What about rape without an extrinsic, violent assault? How
should the law conceive of that crime, and what is its harm?
37 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the imposition of capital punishment for the rape of an adult woman is
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment).
38 Id. at 587.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 597.
43 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger responded:
A rapist not only violates a victim's privacy and personal integrity, but
inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the
process. The long-range effect upon the victim's life and health is likely to
be irreparable; it is impossible to measure the harm which results. Volumes
have been written by victims, physicians, and psychiatric specialists on the
lasting injury suffered by rape victims. Rape is not a mere physical
attack-it is destructive of the human personality.
Id. at 611-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He continued, stating that "[v]ictims may
recover from the physical damage of knife or bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or
a club, but recovery from such a gross assault on the human personality is not
healed by medicine or surgery." Id. at 612.
[Vol. 79:625
ALL-AMERICAN RAPE
Professor Donald Dripps proposes a commodity theory of
sexuality in which "individuals have a property right to the use of
their bodies."44  Based on this theory, Dripps advocates that
states criminalize two separate offenses. 45 The first, "sexually
motivated assault," mirrors the classic rape narrative. 46 The
second, "sexual expropriation," is, inter alia, sexual penetration
with a person "known by the actor to have expressed the refusal
to engage in that act, without subsequently expressly revoking
that refusal."47 Dripps describes the harm of this crime as the
"nonviolent" taking of another person's body for sexual
purposes, 48 and categorizes it as a "misdemeanor or a minor
felony" punishable by the maximum of a year and a day.49 In
support of punishing sexual expropriation so much less severely,
Dripps asserts:
Physical violence in general does far more harm to the victim's
welfare than an unwanted sex act. Physical violence in general
expresses a more complete indifference, or a more intense
hostility, to the victim's humanity.50
He continues:
I venture the suggestion that people generally, male and female,
would rather be subjected to unwanted sex than be shot,
slashed, or beaten with a tire iron .... [W]hether measured by
the welfare or by the dignity of the victim, as a general matter
unwanted sex is not as bad as violence. 5
1
Therefore, to Dripps, the all-American rape, would be
"sexual expropriation," and its harm would be analogous to a
44 Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1789 (1992).
45 See id. at 1799-1800 (explaining how "expropriation should be criminal, but
to a lesser degree than sexually motivated assault").
46 See id. at 1807. Dripps' proposed model statute for the crime of "Sexually
Motivated Assault" would provide in pertinent part:
Whoever purposely or knowingly gives another person cause to fear
physical injury, or purposely or knowingly inflicts physical injury on
another person, or purposely or knowingly overpowers another's physical
resistance, for the purpose of causing any person to engage in a sexual act,
is guilty of Sexually Motivated Assault.
Id.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 1800.
49 Id. at 1804.
50 Id. at 1800.
51 Id. at 1801.
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property taking for sexual purposes. 52
Dripps' conception of sexual expropriation has some intuitive
appeal. Victims often feel as if something of great value has been
stolen from them in the act of rape. 53 Their loss, however, is not
analogous to a physical taking of property. Rape steals or
destroys a victim's sense of physical integrity and safety, which
cannot be restored like pilfered loot. As Professor Robin West
argues:
Dripps's theft analogy wildly misdescribes the experience of
rape .... From the victim's perspective, unwanted sexual
penetration involves unwanted force, and unwanted force is
violent-it is physically painful, sometimes resulting in internal
tearing and often leaving scars. Dripps omits this central
feature of the experience. The offense that he calls
"expropriation" is itself a forceful, physical, and in a word,
assaultive penetration of one person's body by another. It is not
in any way a "larcenous taking." Rape ... [is] experienced, and
typically described, as more like spiritual murder than either
robbery or larceny. 54
Moreover, Dripps' assertion that extrinsic violence
"expresses a more complete indifference, or a more intense
hostility, to the victim's humanity"55 than does nonconsensual
sexual penetration is dubious. His assertion that people would
rather be subjected to "unwanted sex" than be shot with a gun,
slashed with a knife, or beaten with a tire iron places a thumb on
the scale: nonconsensual penetration of the body is described as
"unwanted sex," and each assault he compares it to threatens
death. Death is worse than anything else, but surely that proves
little. Without deadly peril, which rape rarely threatens,56 the
harm from assault may look quite less serious than the all-
52 This assumes that the victim objects verbally or physically. Often, however,
acquaintance rape victims do not object because they are frozen in fright. See
Anderson, supra note 1.
53 See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the
Myth of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439, 446 (1993) (describing
how a victim of rape suffers "the penultimate violation").
54 Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993).
55 Dripps, supra note 44, at 1800.
56 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES
AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 12, 27 (1997)
(noting that fewer than one percent of rape victims in the United States are killed
and only five percent suffer serious extrinsic injury).
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American rape.
Given the degraded conceptualization of women's bodies as
to-be-penetrated and the conceptualization of men's bodies as
physically inviolable, it may be easier for some to see the relative
harm of rape on a male body. I would venture to guess that most
men, no matter their sexual orientation, would rather take a
physical beating that causes two broken ribs and severe bruising
than be pinned down and suffer nonconsensual, anal penetration
by someone they despised, particularly if the penetration
happened repeatedly over the course of an hour or more-as
many acquaintances rapes do 57-and included the rapist's
internal orgasm. 58 Without a condom, which most rapes do not
include, 59 this invasion would also pose the threat of sexually
transmitted diseases. When the victim is female, all this harm
attends, as well as the risk of unwanted pregnancy, which takes
her body hostage for much longer and forces upon her the
profound ethical dilemma of what to do with the fetus. Dripps
does not account for this harm, and his theory of sexual
expropriation cannot capture it.
Professor Stephen Schulhofer advocates a different theory of
rape not based on a property right to one's body, but instead on
sexual autonomy, or "the freedom of every person to decide
whether and when to engage in sexual relations. '60 Like Dripps,
Schulhofer advocates that states criminalize two separate sexual
offenses.61 The first, a second-degree felony he calls "sexual
assault," criminalizes the use of "physical force to compel another
person to submit to an act of sexual penetration. '" 62 This offense
mirrors the classic rape narrative. Schulhofer's second crime, a
57 JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
CRIME 65-69 (1993) (citing research indicating that acquaintance rapes may occur
repeatedly and last much longer than stranger rapes).
58 In terms of the harm of male rape when the victim is heterosexual, never in
the literature have I seen an argument that the harm is greater when the victim is a
lesbian penetrated by a man or the victim is a straight woman penetrated by a
lesbian. Again, penetration is scripted as normative for the female body.
59 Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 599, 602 (2005) (explaining how "[m]en who rape recklessly, by not
finding the time or compassion to discern a partner's consent, rarely find time to use
a condom").
60 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 99 (1998).
61 Id. at 105.
62 Id. at 283.
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third degree felony he calls "sexual abuse," criminalizes "an act of
sexual penetration with another person, when he knows that he
does not have the consent of the other person."63 Its harm is the
"nonviolent interference with sexual autonomy."64 Therefore, the
all-American rape, to Schulhofer, is sexual abuse, and its harm is
the nonviolent interference with the victim's sexual choice.
Schulhofer's conception of rape enjoys more intuitive appeal
than does Dripps'. It is true that rape constitutes an interference
with one's sexual autonomy. But many things interfere with
sexual autonomy, such as prohibitions on teacher/student sexual
relationships, laws against public nudity, and a commitment to
monogamy. Autonomy is not an absolute concept, and
constraints on sexual autonomy are not always bad. 65
Schulhofer's focus on sexual autonomy is also inadequate to
capture the harm of rape. The lack of sexual choice is part of
rape, to be sure, but rape is so much more than that. The offense
involves a profound dehumanization that the lack of sexual
choice does not reflect. 66 Moreover, Schulhofer's characterization
of sexual abuse as "nonviolent," like Dripps' characterization of
sexual expropriation as "nonviolent," comprehends no intrinsic
violence in the all-American rape itself and thereby greatly
minimizes the harm of the offense. 67
As a final note, neither Dripps nor Schulhofer labels the all-
American rape as "rape," but assigns it the lesser monikers of
"sexual expropriation" and "sexual abuse," respectively. 68 Both
would require force for the highest, non-aggravated sexual
63 Id. Schulhofer also allows recklessness or criminal negligence to establish the
mens rea of the crime, although negligence moves the grading of the crime down a
degree. Id. at 284. He defines "consent" as "actual words or conduct indicating
affirmative, freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration." Id. at 283.
64 Id. at 105.
65 Dripps, supra note 44, at 1787 (explaining that autonomy can only be given a
coherent meaning when assigned to specific instances of behavior).
66 Henderson, supra note 26, at 226 (describing rape as an experience which
denies the victim's humanity as opposed to undesired sex which does not completely
deny one's personhood).
67 In the second wave of feminism, it was popular to proclaim, "Rape is violence,
not sex." See Mary Ann Largen, The Anti-Rape Movement: Past and Present, in RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 1, 5 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed.,
1985). This assertion attempted to legitimate the harm of rape, but may have ended
up underscoring the classic rape narrative as the standard rape. As we shall see in
the next section of the essay, rape may be more aptly described as an expression of
power through nonconsensual sexual penetration and its intrinsic violence.
63 Dripps, supra note 44, at 1796-97; SCHULHOFER, supra note 60, at 105.
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offense, just as forty-three state statutes currently do.
IV. RAPE AS EXPERIENCED BY VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS
The lived experience of rape for rape victims and rapists
sheds a different light on the harm of the act. Although each
rape is unique, certain themes of harm do emerge:
dehumanization, objectification, and domination. Professor
Henderson has written eloquently of her rape:
I had never confronted the utter helplessness of rape, of
knowing that it just did not matter that I existed; that I did not
want this; that I was a human being; not a thing to be invaded,
punched, or possibly killed.69
She elaborated:
Rape denies that you are a person, that you exist .... [W]omen
experience total helplessness and obliteration during rape.
When a woman's existence just does not matter, intercourse
becomes rape. Her existence may not matter whether the
attack is by a date, a spouse, a friend, or a stranger. Thus, the
important factor is non-existence. 70
The rape memoir, which has emerged as a new literary
genre, reflects similar themes. One rape memoirist has written
that human language itself was lost in her experience of sexual
domination: "[a]nd [his] words made me give them up, lobbing off
each part of my body as he claimed ownership-the mouth, the
tongue, my breasts."71 A second wrote:
In the scheme of things, his penis, although employed as a
bludgeon, did not make much of an impression. What he did
with it was the least of my worries. Those parts of my body that
hitherto had been reserved and private were no longer mine,
but in this they were indistinguishable from the rest of my body,
also no longer mine.72
She concluded, "The rapist.., made my body an object."73 A
third memoirist explained, "I actually remember little in my
thoughts and feelings about the physical experience of being
69 Henderson, supra note 26, at 223.
70 Id. at 226.
71 ALICE SEBOLD, LUCKY 16 (1999).
72 NANCY VENABLE RAINE, AFTER SILENCE: RAPE AND MY JOURNEY BACK 11
(1998).
73 Id. at 163.
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raped. I remember in my body the subjugation of my body."74
Interviews with convicted rapists echo the same refrain. A
man convicted of multiple rapes explained, "I liked that feeling of
being totally dominant."75 A gang rapist said of his victim, "I had
no feelings [for her] at all, she was like an object."76 Another
rapist admitted, "I felt in control, dominant. Rape was the ability
to have sex without caring about the woman's response. I was
totally dominant."77 Another said, "She wasn't like a person, no
personality, just domination on my part."78s
The experiences of these victims and rapists probably reflect
the classic rape narrative. It is difficult to find studies of all-
American rape victims and perpetrators because those victims so
rarely report and those perpetrators are so rarely convicted.
What we do know about all-American rape victims is that they
talk about their experiences much less, they endure greater
feelings of self-blame and guilt, and the psychological damage
they suffer is as severe or worse than stranger rape victims.7 9
The evidence we have about all-American rapists suggests
that dominance is a central motivation for rape. One study of
undetected acquaintance rapists found that their propensity to
rape was significantly related to their belief that men were
supposed to be dominant and women submissive.80 Male college
students who have engaged in sexually aggressive behaviors are
more likely to agree with statements such as "I enjoy the feeling
of having someone in my grasp," and "I enjoy the conquest [of
74 PATRICIA WEAVER FRANCISCO, TELLING: A MEMOIR OF RAPE AND RECOVERY
28 (1999).
75 DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONVICTED
RAPISTS 133 (1990).
76 Id. at 134. A man who raped his girlfriend's mother agreed, and stated, "I
don't think I had any feelings for her." Id. at 114.
77 Id. at 149-50. Another explained, "I felt macho and power over her. Maybe a
little anger. I felt she was a dirty slut and anything we did was justified. It gave me
a sense of status .... I felt like I had put her in her place." Id. at 134.
78 Id. at 156.
79 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 57, at 70-71, 165 (citing studies which
show that the effects of rape upon victims of acquaintance rape were notably
different from the effects felt by stranger rape victims).
80 Shelly Schaefer Hinck & Richard W. Thomas, Rape Myth Acceptance in
College Students: How Far Have We Come?, 40 SEX ROLES 815, 816 (1999) (citing
studies of undetected, self-reported acquaintance rapists, which revealed a relation
between a propensity to rape or engage in sexually abusive behavior and various
rape-supportive attitudes).
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sex]."81 Additionally, being motivated sexually by dominance is a
predictor among college students of a willingness to impose
sexual acts upon others without their consent.8 2
It appears that both victims and rapists often experience
rape as domination. Their experiences contrast strongly with
Dripps' description of rape as sexual commodity theft. Their
experiences also deepen Schulhofer's otherwise thin description
of rape as a violation of sexual autonomy. Not only does the all-
American rape involve the lack of sexual choice-the violation of
sexual autonomy that Schulhofer decries-but it also involves the
degradation of the body and spirit through objectification and
dehumanization.
V. SEXUALLY INVASIVE DEHUMANIZATION
When one views rape from the perspective of those who
experience it, rape no longer appears simply to be sexual theft or
a violation of sexual autonomy. Instead, rape is sexually invasive
dehumanization. There may be a number of legal implications to
such a conceptualization. Here, I will just suggest one.
To dehumanize means to "deprive of human character or
attributes," make inanimate, treat as an object, and deprive of
one's concern.8 3 To humanize, by contrast, means "to give a
human character to" and to imbue with concern.8 4 Humans
possess the ability to inquire about one another's feelings and to
express concern by that inquiry and their response to it. This
kind of communication prevents the objectification of one's
partner and creates the possibility for empathy.
I believe rape law should require communication between
partners before sexual intercourse occurs. In a forthcoming
article in the Southern California Law Review, I argue that a
person should be required to inquire about his or her partner's
desires and boundaries and to come to an agreement with them
about sexual penetration before it occurs. This communication
81 Neil M. Malamuth, Predictors of Naturalistic Sexual Aggression, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 956 (1986); see also Neil M. Malamuth,
Predicting Laboratory Aggression Against Female and Male Targets: Implications for
Sexual Aggression, 22 J. RES. PERSONALITY 474, 481-82 (1988).
82 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 57, at 31 (citing studies of primarily
college students indicating that anger and dominance motives of sex are predictors
of nonconsensual sexual behavior).
83 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 402 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed. 1989).
84 7 id. at 476.
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would express a willingness to consider the other person's
humanity. It would express that the other person exists and
matters. Communication is a mechanism of treating one's
partner as fully human, as a separate and valuable person with
his or her own desires and needs. It best protects against
treating one's partner as an inanimate object to be sexually
dominated.
I close by returning to the classic rape narrative and the
story of an all-American rape that opened this essay. If rape is
sexually invasive dehumanization, the first example, with its
extrinsic violent assaults, involves multiple crimes: aggravated
assault, kidnapping, and rape.
In the second example, the male student ignored the female
student's verbal reservations and cries; he ignored her attempts
to get away. He pushed her down, pinned her, and proceeded to
take off her clothes. He failed to communicate with her and
failed to come to an agreement with her about what they wanted
to do together before he penetrated her. This story tracks what
most acquaintance rape victims experience. Sexually invasive
dehumanization is what the all-American rape victim suffers,
and "rape" is what we should call it.
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